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Abstract— Over the past 10 years, the designers of intellectual 
properties (IP) have faced increasing threats including illegal 
copy or cloning, counterfeiting, reverse-engineering. This is now 
a critical issue for the microelectronics industry, mainly for 
fabless designers and FPGA designers. The design of a secure, 
efficient, lightweight protection scheme for design data is a 
serious challenge for the hardware security community. In this 
context, this paper presents the first ultra-lightweight transmitter 
using side channel leakage based on electromagnetic emanation 
to send embedded IP identity discreetly and quickly. In addition, 
we present our electromagnetic test bench and a coherent 
demodulation method using slippery window spectral analysis to 
recover data outside the device. The hardware resources 
occupied by the transmitter represent less than 0.022% of a 130 
nm Microsemi Fusion FPGA. Experimental results show that the 
demodulation method success to provide IP data with a bit rate 
equal to 500 Kbps. 
Keywords—IP protection; side channel; electromagnetic 
emanation analysis;  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For digital circuit design the re-use of embedded intellectual 
properties (IP) is more and more important due to prohibitive 
cost of ASIC design. Nevertheless the IP business suffers from 
a lack a security due to the intrinsic form of IPs sales and 
exchanges. Many dedicated threats target the IP life cycle and 
result to revenues losses for the IP designers [1]. The IP threat 
model includes illegal re-use, illegal sales, cloning (illegal 
copy) of the IP. The extent of threats targeting IPs is linked to 
the type of IP: software IPs (typically hardware description 
language files), firmware IPs (synthesized netlist), and 
hardware IPs (FPGA bitstream or physical layout).  
One of the solutions for the IP designers to protect their 
intellectual property is to be able to detect the presence of a 
copy of an IP embedded in a digital device by using IP 
identification. Works on IP watermarking and IP 
fingerprinting try to provide the IP identification service. But, 
most of the time the published solutions are not practical 
mainly because of the complexity of the 
watermarking/fingerprinting verification scheme [2]. Efficient 
IP identification scheme needs to be contactless, rapid and 
ultra-lightweight. Up to now, these three characteristics are 
not available in the state-of-the-art. To meet these 
requirements, in this paper we propose an ultra-lightweight 
binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) transmitter to forward 
IP identity (that could generated for example by a feedback 
shift-register or a physical unclonable function [1]) discreetly 
using an electromagnetic channel. Such circuit is usually 
called “spy circuitry”. Using the electromagnetic channel, it is 
possible to contactless check the presence of an IP inside a 
digital device. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we present related works. In Section 3, we detail the proposed 
electromagnetic communication of data (i.e. IC/IP 
information). In Section 4, we present a method to analyze the 
electromagnetic spectrum to BFSK signal demodulation. In 
Section 5, we compare published spy circuitries that use a 
side-channel for IP protection and hardware Trojans. In 
Section 6, we present two industrial scenarios for the use of 
the proposed IP protection scheme and in Section 7 we present 
our conclusions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Well-known threat in cryptographic engineering is side 
channel attacks [3], [4]. Most of the dynamic characteristics of 
both hardware and software implementations of cryptographic 
primitives can be used for side channel analysis: computation 
time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, optical 
radiation, even the sound produced during computation. These 
side channels can be used as transmission channels to send 
intellectual property data from a device or an embedded IP. 
For example in [5], the thermal channel representing a 
contactless communication was used to transfer information 
from an embedded tag to a remote receiver. However the 
embedded thermal tag used in this commercial solution 
requires a relatively large area (255 Spartan-3 slices). In [6], 
the authors propose using two shift registers to generate a 
recognizable signature-dependent power consumption pattern 
to reveal the IP signature. Power consumption was also used 
in [7] to communicate the IP identity. To reinforce such work, 
the authors of [8] propose using the power supply signal of an 
IP as a physical hash function for fingerprinting.  
Related works can be found also in the malicious hardware 
design such as hardware Trojans. Such systems use side 
channels to forward secret information such as a symmetric 
cipher key from cryptographic hardware implementation [9], 
TABLE I.  HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF THE 
BFSK TRANSMITTER 
N K 
f0 
(MHz) 
f1 
(MHz) 
Fusion 
Tiles 
LUT4 EG 
0 
1 385 280 3 2 4.67 
2 383 210 4 3 5.34 
3 384 151 5 4 6.01 
4 385 130 6 5 6.68 
5 381 111 7 6 7.35 
1 
1 272 189 4 3 5.34 
2 272 156 5 4 6.01 
3 270 120 6 5 6.68 
4 271 106 7 6 7.35 
5 269 93 8 7 8.02 
2 
1 168 144 5 4 6.01 
2 169 124 6 5 6.68 
3 169 100 7 6 7.35 
4 168 91 8 7 8.02 
5 168 79 9 8 8.69 
3 
1 146 128 6 5 6.68 
2 147 112 7 4 7.35 
3 146 92 8 5 8.02 
4 145 84 9 6 8.69 
5 144 74 10 7 9.36 
4 
1 123 110 7 6 7.35 
2 121 98 8 7 8.02 
3 122 83 9 8 8.69 
4 121 77 10 9 9.36 
5 119 70 11 10 10.03 
 
[10], but also to cause or amplify side-channel leakage of 
cryptographic hardware [11]. 
Expect [5], all the related works use power consumption as 
a communication channel which is not contactless. Unlike the 
proposed solution, all the related works are not lightweight and 
rapid as the section 5 of this paper will show. 
III. PROPOSED EM COMMUNICATION OF IP DATA 
Electromagnetic radiation is an efficient side channel since, 
unlike measurement of power consumption, electromagnetic 
radiation can be measured locally. One of the main advantages 
of this side channel is that it is impossible to hide the leak 
concerning electromagnetic radiation by using a global 
countermeasure. Moreover the electromagnetic test bench is 
not expensive (less than US$ 10K without an oscilloscope, 
which is the most expensive component). Last but not least, a 
spectral analysis of the electromagnetic radiation provides 
information on the oscillating structure such as a ring-
oscillator [12]. For all these reasons, we use the 
electromagnetic channel for our IP identification scheme. To 
this end, we designed an ultra-lightweight BFSK transmitter 
which could be activated outside the device by an ID checker 
or internally by a specific event (e.g. specific input sequence, 
internal data value, system state). Note that an enable signal is 
required to reduce the power consumed by the ring oscillator. 
Moreover, a permanently activated transmitter could be 
detected more easily by a spectral analysis of electromagnetic 
emanations of the device and could also cause local heating 
and premature aging of the chip. 
BFSK is one of the common modulation schemes used in 
digital communication. The binary data are sent using a 
sinusoidal carrier at two frequency tones f0 and f1, representing 
high (‘1’) and low (‘0’) logic levels. The binary data arriving 
at the transmitter input at certain bitrates determine the 
commutation of the tones at the transmitter output. The 
proposed BFSK transmitter uses a dedicated configurable 
ring-oscillator, as shown in Fig. 1. The configurable ring-
oscillator is designed using one multiplexor, N+K delay 
elements, and a feedback chain controlled by a NAND gate for 
activation of transmission to reduce power consumption. 
Actually, the transmitter is used only during a short time when 
the enable signal is high, and it consumes power only during 
this small piece of time. The power consumption of this 
transmitter is thus completely negligible. 
Input data controls the multiplexor, as shown in Fig. 1. 
When input data is low, the ring oscillator uses N delays and 
its oscillation frequency is f0. When input data is high, the ring 
oscillator uses N+K delays and its oscillation frequency is f1. 
Since the ring oscillator’s oscillation frequency decreases with 
an increase in the number of delay elements, frequency f0 is 
higher than frequency f1. These two frequencies have to be 
selected according to the bandwidth of the electromagnetic 
analysis platform, which is used to acquire and measure the 
transmitted signal. The bandwidth of our test bench, which is 
described in Section 4, was limited to 100 MHz and 1 GHz by 
the low-noise amplifier. 
The proposed BFSK transmitter was implemented in 
Microsemi FUSION flash based FPGA (130 nm CMOS 
technology) containing 600K logic gates (M7AFS600). The 
device contains 13 824 tiles, each tile can be used to 
implement one D-flip-flop or one configurable multiplexor-
based logic block implementing any 3-input logic function. 
The configurable number of delays in the ring oscillator of 
the proposed BFSK transmitter makes it possible to select 
precisely the two frequencies f0 and f1 using parameters N and 
K. Table I lists the ring oscillator frequencies and the number 
of Fusion tiles used by the BFSK transmitter for five values of 
N and K, with N ranging from 0 to 4, and K ranging from 1 to 
5. According to Table I, f0 can be chosen between 119 MHz 
(N=4) and 385 MHz (N=0) and f1 can be chosen between 70 
MHz (N=4, K=5) and 280 MHz (N=0, K=1). The exact value 
of f0 depends on the number of delay elements, but also on the 
placement and routing of the transmitter. For the values N and 
K listed in Table I, the frequency variation was less than 1.7% 
(the maximum frequency deviation in Table I is 2 MHz when 
N = 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N delays
K delays
0
1
Input data 
Enable
 
Fig. 1. Architecture of the ultra-lightweight digital BFSK transmitter 
based on a configurable ring oscillator.  
The number of tiles used by the BFSK transmitter is very 
low, i.e. from 3 tiles (N=0, K=1) to 11 tiles (N=4, K=5). 
These values are equivalent to less than 0.022% and less than 
0.080% of the total number of tiles included in the targeted 
600K-gate FUSION FPGA, respectively. This very small 
number of tiles is very promising for good dissimulation of the 
BFSK transmitter inside the sea of gates/tiles. In order to 
estimate the number of resources needed for implementation 
with Xilinx SRAM FPGA or Altera SRAM FPGA, Table I 
gives the number of 4-input look-ups (LUT4) used by the 
BFSK transmitter with such FPGAs. 
To evaluate the logical resources needed by the BFSK 
transmitter in ASIC implementations, the right hand column in 
Table I gives the number of equivalent gates (EG) in the 
transmitter. The gate count was estimated using the Virtual 
Silicon  standard cell library based on the UMC L180 0.18 µm 
1P6M Logic process (UMCL18G212T3 [13]). The delay gates 
are replaced by more efficient standard NOT gates. The gate 
count of a standard NOT gate is 0.67 EG, and that of the 
standard multiplexor, 2.33 EG. The standard NAND gate uses 
1 EG. So the number of gates of the whole BFSK transmitter 
ranges from 4.67 EG (N = 0, K = 1) to 10.03 EG (N = 4, K = 
5). Note that one flip-flop requires between 5.33 EG and 12.33 
EG to store a single bit [13].  
Such a transmitter is clearly ultra-lightweight in both FPGA 
and ASIC implementations. The small logical resources 
requirement of the proposed spy circuitry makes reverse 
engineering it harder, although not impossible [15]. Even with 
recent CMOS technologies, the attacker can reverse engineer 
ICs using a scanning electron microscope and an automatic 
tool for circuitry extraction [15], [16]. Nevertheless, the smaller 
the piece of hardware used for BFSK transmitter the harder it is 
to detect during reverse engineering. Detection of the 
transmitter using standard Trojan detection methods [17], [18] 
is not feasible because the transmitter does not change the data 
path of the circuit and because of the ultra-low signal-to-noise 
ratio on the electromagnetic channel, as shown in our 
experimental results below (Section 4). 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The electromagnetic radiation of the device was evaluated 
using the near-field electromagnetic analysis test bench 
described in [12]. The border between the far field and the 
near field can be considered to be about 23 mm from the 
device, depending on the hardware concerned. The most 
important part of the test bench is the acquisition chain. It 
determines the signal to noise ratio and measurement 
precision. 
The chain, as presented Fig. 2, is composed of: 
 A Langer magnetic probe with a frequency range of from 
30 MHz to 3 GHz and a spatial resolution of 
approximately 500 µm. 
 A Miteq low-noise amplifier with a frequency range of 
from 100 MHz to 1 GHz. 
 A LeCroy oscilloscope with a frequency range of up to 
3.5 GHz and a sampling rate of up to 40 GS/s. 
As presented in Fig. 2, the device to be tested (the board) is 
fixed to a XYZ table with repeatability of movement of 1 µm. 
The test bench, including the acquisition chain, XYZ table, 
FPGA configuration and power supply variations, is 
controlled by a computer. 
Fig. 2. Near-field Electromagnetic analysis test bench. 
Electromagnetic analysis of IC is contactless, local, and can 
be spatial or/and temporal. This last point makes it possible to 
perform frequency analysis of the electromagnetic emanation. 
In the your bench the spectral range is limited to 100 MHz and 
1 GHz. Standard devices aimed at direct BFSK demodulation 
cannot be used for these relatively high frequencies. Available 
integrated BFSK demodulators are limited to a few dozen 
megahertz. For this reason, we developed a dedicated BFSK 
demodulation scheme for our needs, in which a spectral 
analysis of the low noise amplifier output (a component of the 
test bench) is performed to measure the f0 and f1 spectral 
contribution. The transmitted high (low) level is detected 
when f1 spectral contribution is higher (lower) than that of f0. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the spectral analysis of the BFSK 
transmitter’s electromagnetic emission when N = 1 and K = 1, 
which corresponds to a small transmitter with high frequencies 
in Table I. For the spectral analysis, a 16 384 points FFT was 
computed. Fig. 3 presents a zoom (X and Y axis) on the global 
spectrum of the local EM emanation of the circuit when the 
BFSK transmitter sends a ‘0’ (in blue) and when the BFSK 
transmitter sends a ‘1’ (in red). Notice also that we placed a 
small antenna in the close vicinity of the ring. The amplitude 
of the spectral rays at 180, 200, 220, 240, 260, 280 MHz are 
very high compared to the two spectral rays at 189.2 MHz and 
272.2 MHz. However, we have cut the upper part of the 
spectrum in order to see the two interesting rays (at 189.2 
MHz and 272.2 MHz). These frequencies correspond to the 
spectral contribution of the BFSK frequencies f0 and f1. 
Actually, according to Table I, for Microsemi FUSION FPGA, 
the frequency f0 is around 272 MHz and f1 is around 189 MHz. 
Slight variations in the frequency values (around the values 
presented in Table I) are due to environmental variations 
(mainly temperature). These variations are too small to 
jeopardize the success of demodulation because the BFSK 
designer knows the chosen parameters N and K and targeted 
frequencies f0 and f1 for transmission of low and high levels. 
Fig. 3. Parts (zoom in x-axis and y-axis) of the electromagnetic emanation 
spectral analysis of the proposed BFSK transmitter when it sends a high level 
at f1=189.2MHz (in red) and when it sends a low level at f0=272.2 MHz (in 
blue). 
Without knowledge of the BFSK parameters, the 
electromagnetic transmission cannot be easily detected 
because it cannot be distinguished from spectral noise. The 
signal-to-noise ratio of the BFSK transmission in Fig. 3 is -
135 dB for a 1 GHz bandwidth. Such an ultra-low SNR 
represents efficient protection against unwanted BFSK 
transmitter detection via a side channel. However, knowing 
the N and K parameters, the BFSK designer can calibrate the 
demodulation (determine the two frequencies) by 
electromagnetic analysis of the ring oscillators based on the 
differential spectral analysis as described in [12]. 
The spectral contribution of the two BFSK frequencies 
during transmission (which is limited by the transmitter enable 
signal) at the low-noise amplifier output is measured to 
determine the transmitted bit sequence. In order to apply the 
demodulation technique described here, called coherent 
demodulation, theoretically the bitstream rate (bitrate) is 
limited to 0.5 times the frequency difference between f0 and f1. 
In the case shown in Fig. 3, theoretically the maximum bitrate 
is 41.5 Mbps (theoretically limited to 53 Mbps when N = 0 
and K = 1). The coherent demodulation scheme cannot be 
used for higher bitrates, instead more sophisticated and more 
expensive demodulation techniques should be used. To reduce 
the size of the BFSK transmitter, a time-interleaving 
transmitter should be used to increase the bitrate. However, 
the high transmission rate is not so important, because data 
(e.g. IP identifier or stolen data) can be stored at a higher data 
rate before being transmitted at a slower rate. The small area 
and unobtrusiveness of the BSFK transmitter are much more 
important properties than transmission rate. 
For the coherent demodulation of the electromagnetic 
radiation, we propose a slippery window spectral analysis. 
Indeed, overall spectral analysis masks the effects of the 
nonstationarity of the signal and therefore provides no 
information about its temporal evolution. Slippery window 
spectral analysis is a three-dimensional representation of the 
signal: amplitude, frequency, and time. It requires two 
quantities Fw, the width of the FFT window frame and the 
difference Δτ between two frames. For our experiment, we 
chose Fw equal to 16 384 points (214-point FFT) and Δτ equal 
to 100 points. For each frame, the FFT provides the software 
demodulator with the amplitude of signals f0 and f1 which 
enables the demodulator to distinguish between a transmitted 
‘1’ or ‘0’. 
To illustrate data transmission from the circuit via the EM 
channel, we used a shift register that stored the following 16-bit 
sequence:  “1011110111011100”. The clock frequency of the 
shift register is 500 kHz. When the enable signal of the 
transmitter is given, the sequence is sent cyclically to the BFSK 
transmitter, which transmits it via the electromagnetic channel. 
Fig. 4 gives the result of the coherent demodulation obtained at 
a 500 Kbps bit rate, which served as a proof of concept. 
16-bit sequence16-bit sequence
 
Fig. 4. Coherent demodulation of the 16-bit code word cyclically sent by the BFSK transmitter at 500 Kbps, the 
top (bottom) graph corresponds to the spectral contribution of signal at f1 (f0). 
V. COMPARISON WITH STATE OF THE ART SPY CIRCUITRIES 
USING A SIDE-CHANNEL 
Table II compares the implementation of the proposed ultra-
lightweight BFSK transmitter with other recently published 
state of the art methods. Table II gives the spy circuitry 
application (App.) for each reference; this may be IP 
protection (IPP) or hardware Trojan (HT) or both (for the 
presented work, PW). In addition, Table II gives the year of 
publication (YoP), the side channel used, the hardware 
resources required only for the leakage generator (for example 
we do not take the hardware used for IP watermark generation 
or the Trojan’s payload into account). Unfortunately, the 
principles compared do not use the same hardware. For the 
sake of correctness, we give the implementation results as they 
are presented in the referenced papers. Nevertheless, the 
implementation bitrate of these previously published works 
can be roughly compared with our proposed solution. Based 
on published data, we computed the bitrate of all the proposals 
by using the number of clock cycles needed to send 
information via the side channel. For all the references 
presented in this table, the bitrate was computed using a 500 
KHz frequency for data synchronization (same frequency is 
used for data transmission in Fig. 4). 
As can be seen in Table II, the proposed work reaches the 
highest bitrate. The reason for such a good performance is first 
that we use a spectral analysis of the local electromagnetic 
leak based on a simple frequency modulation. Except for [4], 
all the other solutions use a global measurement of power 
consumption, which reduces the signal-to-noise ratio of the 
information leaked via the side channel. Our proposal is 
clearly the smallest spy circuitry ever published. Although 
solutions based on circular shift-registers are well adapted to 
last generation FPGA families, since the 16-bit shift registers 
can be designed using only one look-up table, they are not 
suitable for ASIC technologies. Currently, an ASIC 
implementation of a 16-bit shift register requires 16 flip-flops 
whereas the solution we propose occupies an area equivalent 
to only one D-flip-flop. 
In this paper, we present the proposed spy circuitry for IP 
protection, but it can also be used for hardware Trojan. Most 
of the other proposals could also be used for both applications. 
Note that in 2012, Kasper et al. proposed to use the work 
initiated in [9] for hardware Trojan or IP watermarking 
implementation [19]. However, by using electromagnetic 
emanation and a configurable ring oscillator, the proposed 
solution is the most convincing for industrial applications 
(e.g., those aimed at IP protection) because of its very small 
area and high bitrate. 
VI. INDUSTRIAL SCENARIOS USING THE PROPOSED IP 
PROTECTION 
According to the previous section, in comparison with other 
works, our propose goes clearly towards using a spy circuit in 
an industrial context for IP protection. Two industrial 
scenarios are presented in the following. 
The first scenario is the identification of embedded IP in the 
supply chain. This identification is used in order to be sure to 
don’t use counterfeiting (fake) devices. In recent years, the 
issue of counterfeiting of integrated circuits has increased 
considerably. For example, the number of counterfeit 
electronic circuits collected by U.S. Customs from 2001 to 
2011 has increased by around 700 [20]. Between 2007 and 
2010, U.S. Customs collected 5.6 million counterfeit electronic 
products [21]. Overall, the estimation of counterfeiting is about 
7% of the semiconductor market [22] which represented a loss 
of about $ 22 billion in 2014 for the legal industry. 
It is therefore crucial and strategic to be able to detect 
counterfeit IC as soon as possible in the supply chain (this is 
particularly crucial for military and space grad devices). Fig. 5 
shows a possible framework to manage the device under test 
(control the enable signal) and check the IP identification by 
using an EM probe, an amplifier and a dedicated acquisition 
system including a spectral analysis and the proposed 
demodulation method. Due to the high bit rate of the 
proposition solution the identification of the ID requires less 
than 1ms (with 500Kps bit rate as in Fig 4.). This 
counterfeiting detection could be completed by other physical 
(invasive or not) and optical inspection [23].    
  
Fig. 4. Rapid and contactless IP identification in the supply chain by using EM 
transmission of IP ID.  
The second scenario occurs when a IP designers would like 
to verify the illegal presence of its IP inside a device (ASIC or 
FPGA). In this case the proposed transmitter provides to the 
TABLE II 
SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF SPY 
CIRCUITRIES EXPLOITING SIDE-CHANNELS 
App. Ref. YoP Side channel Hardware 
resources 
Target 
Bit rate 
(@500 
KHz) 
IPP 
[5] 2008 Thermal 
emanation 
255 Spartan-3 
slices 
Xilinx 
Spartan-3 
7.10-3 bps 
[6] 2008 
Power 
consumption 
16 * 16-bit 
circular shift-
registers 
Xilinx 
Spartan-3 
and  
Virtex-II 
200 bps 
[7] 2010 Power 
consumption 
16-bit circular 
shift-register 
Xilinx  
Virtex-II Pro 
500 bps 
HT 
[9] 2009 
Power 
consumption 
8 parallel D-
flip-flops or 16-
bit circular shit 
register 
Xilinx 
Spartan-3E 
and  
Virtex-II Pro 
485 bps 
[10] 2013 Power 
consumption 
16-bit circular 
shift-registers 
per bit 
Xilinx  
Virtex-5 
976 bps 
Both PW 2015 
Electro-
magnetic 
emanation 
1 configurable 
ring-oscillator 
(like a D-flip-
flop in ASIC) 
Microsemi 
Fusion 
500 Kbps 
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identification scheme a data like a PUF [24] or a 
watermarking. Watermarking is a technique of steganography 
which provides the ownership of an IC (or an IP) by checking 
for the presence of hidden information called the watermark 
[3]. Most of the watermarking methods proposed in the 
literature need a complex verification scheme. Nevertheless it 
is possible to use power consumption as proposed in [8] and 
[3] but it is easy and cheap to use global countermeasure in 
order to mask the power consumption due to the watermark 
[25]. Using electromagnetic emanation in this scenario is 
better because as electromagnetic emanation is local it is really 
hard to mask it by using a global countermeasure. Moreover, 
in this paper we have shown that due to the SNR of BFSK 
signal, it is unrealistic to try to detect it without the precise 
knowledge of the used frequencies for data transmission.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
IP protection has become crucial topics for hardware 
security due to the lack of trust in IP market. In this paper, we 
have presented an ultra-lightweight transmitter of IP identity 
using the electromagnetic side channel. Based on a 
configurable ring oscillator, our solution exploits a BFSK 
signal to transmit information by way of the electromagnetic 
channel. By performing a slippery window spectral analysis of 
the near field electromagnetic emanations captured locally 
over the BFSK transmitter circuitry, the proposed transmission 
achieves a high bitrate (experimentally 500 Kbps and 
theoretically limited to 53 Mbps with a Microsemi Fusion 
FPGA), which has not been achieved before. Moreover, the 
transmitter occupies very small area. For the highest frequency 
and data rate, our solution requires 4.67 equivalent gates, 
which it is less than the requirement of a small D-flip-flop. 
Such a small requirement of logical resources makes reverse 
engineering of the chip very difficult and detection of the 
transmitter using standard Trojan detection methods is not 
feasible. 
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